This paper focusses on the interaction between regulation and competition in a simple industrial organization model. We analyze how regulation affects the pro®tability of ®nancial institutions. We ®nd that information asymmetries impose a heavy regulatory burden on the higher-quality banks, highlighting the importance of ®ne-tuning regulation. Our other main results point at the importance of a level playing ®eld.
Introduction
The ®nancial services industry is arguably unique in that the concern about the safety and soundness of the ®nancial system has led to intrusive regulatory interference. Recently, however, this regulatory interference has been called into question. New product innovations and the blurring distinctions between banking and nonbanking ®nancial institutions have transformed the ®nancial services sector into one of the most dynamic and challenging industries. The increasingly competitive and dynamic environment of banking puts severe strains on the viability and effectiveness of regulation. The purpose of this paper is to address and identify the competitive distortions that regulation introduces into the ®nancial services industry.
This general issue has been at the center of much of the recent research on regulation of ®nancial institutions (see the literature review of Bhattacharya, Boot, and Thakor, 1998) . The notions of``regulatory arbitrage'' and``level playing ®eld'' play important roles here. 1 With the current highly competitive and dynamic environment, existing regulations may be too statically oriented or narrowly de®ned, inviting regulatory arbitrage and potentially causing competitive distortions that prevent a level playing ®eld.
This paper pays particular attention to the issue of a level playing ®eld. To this end, we focus on the interaction of regulation and competition in the context of a simple industrial organization model. Our approach is to incorporate the standard agency story of suboptimal monitoring under asymmetric information into an industrial organization framework. The agency story motivates the desirability of regulation; the industrial organization framework allows us to highlight the competitive distortions of intrusive regulation. In our model, banks fund loans using both (insured) deposits and equity capital. Banks provide varying qualities of monitoring services that affect potential credit losses. Our goal is to analyze the effectiveness of regulation, and in particular capital requirements, in light of changes in the competitive environment. 2 Two primary results emerge from our analysis. First, when regulation, by adjusting the capital requirements, changes the cost of funding loans, higher-quality banks (as measured by their monitoring abilities) suffer a greater loss in pro®ts than lower-quality banks. This points at the importance of ®ne-tuning regulation. Second, a change in funding costs caused by regulation induces a greater loss in pro®ts when regulated banks face competition from nonregulated ®rms than when they face only equally regulated competitors or no competitors at all. That is, intrusive regulation is most costly in the absence of a level playing ®eld. When a level playing ®eld is present, the costs of regulation actually may diminish when competition intensi®es; that is, a monopoly bank may suffer more from regulation. However, in the current environment of banking, the increase in competition goes hand in hand with greater diversity in ®nancial service providers that undoubtedly undermines the notion of a level playing ®eld.
Our analysis underscores the importance of analyzing and evaluating regulation in an industrial organization context. The optimal regulatory design should follow from a careful formal analysis of the costs and bene®ts of various types of regulation. The effect of regulation on the competitive position of banksÐas highlighted in our industrial organization frameworkÐis in our view one of the most important considerations.
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. We begin in section 2 with a characterization of the various approaches to regulation. Section 3 contains the industrial organization model and analyzes the interaction between competition and regulation. Section 4 concludes.
Approaches to regulation
A key issue in the design of regulation is whether it stipulates behavior or seeks to induce the desired behavior. To this end, we can distinguish between direct and indirect regulation. Direct forms of regulation explicitly restrict the activities banks can undertake. This form of regulation seeks to reduce discretion on the part of banks (and regulators) by explicitly prescribing and dictating the activities banks can engage in. The Glass-Steagall Act in the United Sstates (separating commercial from investment banking) and the enforced separation between banking and insurance, as observed in many countries around the world, are examples of this approach. While this has the bene®t of clearly restricting possible outcomes, such a regulatory structure runs the risk of being outdated by new developments. The questionable sustainability of the separation between commercial and investment banking in the United States is one example. Recent deregulation addresses this concern. The alternative approach, indirect regulation, does not prescribe behavior (i.e., permissible activities) but rather establishes incremental price and nonprice incentives that are designed to elicit socially desired choices by ®nancial institutions. Ultimately, indirect regulation aims at making undesirable activities more expensive. Risk-based capital adequacy rules are one example. Rather than prohibiting risky activities, they seek to mitigate against risk-taking incentives by making risky lending more expensive to fund than safe lending. The problem here is ®ne-tuning the price incentives. As a further illustration, the indirect approach would sensitize deposit insurance premia to risk in order to encourage low-risk strategies, whereas the direct approach would prohibit high-risk strategies funded with insured deposits. In both cases, compliance would need to be monitored. 3 Existing bank regulatory practices incorporate both direct and indirect elements. For instance, the separation of investment and commercial banking in the United States and Japan, restrictions on branching and insurance, and bank holding company limitations all illustrate direct restrictions. On the other hand, risk-based capital requirements and liquidity reserve requirements illustrate indirect controls. 4 The former approach``brute forces'' the desired behavior, while the latter would induce banks to reach the desired outcome. The latter inducements are feasible only when the regulator is suf®ciently informed to price correctly. However, it could be costly if informational de®ciencies loom large enough. This is particularly true in an environment where competitive distortions could be substantial. Moreover, banks might seek to exploit the discretion that indirect regulation grants them. Indirect regulation may also grant regulators discretion and they may need to be supervised themselves, if only to contain corruption. Indirect regulation therefore requires a well-de®ned regulatory and legal structure.
We may conclude that both direct and indirect forms of regulation are costly, particularly in a more competitive environment, where issues of a level playing ®eld and regulatory arbitrage become of primary concern. Direct regulation seems least compatible with a rapidly changing, competitive environment. The recent wave of both scale and scope expansion in banking underscores the lesser emphasis put on this type of regulation. Indirect regulation has gained importance; witness, for example, the increased emphasis put on further re®ning the risk-based capital requirements and other control instruments. But, in a competitive environment, these instruments must be delicately and constantly ®ne-tuned such that they do not cause competitive distortions. Hence, the applicability of the indirect, control-oriented approach to regulation also is strained. In the next section, we analyze this in the context of an industrial organization model.
Regulatory distortions in a model of industrial organization
We develop a simple industrial organization model of banking that is concerned with the impact of capital requirement regulation on banks under various competitive environments. The main objective is to highlight the distortionary effects of intrusive regulation in a more competitive environment. In future work, we will consider the optimal design of regulation in this industrial organization framework. 5 For now, we focus on the distortionary effects of regulation and highlight the suitability of industrial organization models for analyzing regulatory design issues in banking. We consider a simple static environment, with two dates, t [ f0Y 1g, covering one period. All agents are risk neutral and the riskless rate is normalized to 0.
Players and supply of loans
There are two types of players in the model: banks and regulators. Banks loan funds to ®rms and regulators dictate capital requirements. Loans are funded through (fully insured) deposits and equity capital. 6 We assume that, for each $1 raised, d [ 0Y 1 are funded by deposits and 1 À d funded by equity capital. Banks affect the ®rm's loan repayment probability by providing monitoring efforts; and along this dimension, bank quality t plays an important role. We model two types of banks, good G and bad B.
7 The bank privately knows its own type, and monitoring levels chosen in equilibrium are not observable. Cross-sectionally, a randomly drawn bank is of type G with probability (w.p.) f [ 0Y 1 and of type B w.p. 1 À f.
On extending a loan, the bank must choose its per-loan monitoring level, m [ 0Y 1. It will choose the monitoring level to minimize the total cost of the loan, which includes both potential credit losses from defaults and direct monitoring costs. Expected credit losses are a function of monitoring and given by the function Lm, which is decreasing and concave in m. We assume that credit losses are de®ned as Lm 1 À m. The direct costs of monitoring are given by the increasing and convex function Vm a t m 2 , where a t is inversely related to bank quality. Higher a t , with t [ fGY Bg, denotes a lower-quality bank, and therefore we assume that a G 5a B .
We can then express the expected cost of issuing a $1 loan as
The cost function in (1) captures the idea that credit losses are only partially borne by the bank via equity capital, with the deposit insurer bearing the residual loss. Note also that, at higher levels of capital, the bank internalizes more of the credit losses. 8 The bank chooses m to minimize (1). This results in an optimal monitoring level of
Naturally, the regulator can affect monitoring levels through capital requirements (i.e., 
Market for loans
The aggregate demand for loans over the period is given by O L 40. Each bank then competes as a Cournot duopolist and chooses a quantity of loans L to produce, given by Q L t , where t [ fGY Bg. The per-unit price of L, given by P L , is determined by the inverse demand function:
is the total quantity of L produced. Demand for L is such that there is room for both types of banks to compete. That is, the demand structure allows for positive pro®ts to both competitors. We therefore specify demand such that both players will enter the market for L; that is,
Equilibrium analysis
We ®rst derive general expressions for the output quantities of the two ®rms and their
represent the expected pro®ts of the G and B banks, respectively. The banks will choose and commit to produce Q L t units of output L to maximize their expected pro®ts. That is, for any per-unit production cost of C t , the bank of type t competing with a bank of type w=t solves
which we restate using (3) as
Both type G and B banks will, given their own respective per-unit production cost, solve the maximization problem in (5) . Therefore, the equilibrium outputs and expected pro®ts are:
An immediate implication of eqs. (6) through (9) is that, since
. That is the ®rm that has the cost advantage G gets a larger share of the market and enjoys a higher expected pro®t.
Our interest in this setup is to examine the impact of a change in regulated capital levels 1 À d on the banks' costs, and consequently their respective pro®ts. To contrast the impact of regulation on G versus B banks directly, we consider a change in capital requirements that affects the per-unit production costs of both banks identically. This gives us our ®rst result. Theorem 1. The absolute loss in expected pro®ts for bank G, due to an increase in the per-unit costs of extending a loan, is greater than the commensurate loss in expected pro®ts for bank B; that is,
Proof. Taking the partial derivatives of (8) and (9) with respect to their individual perunit costs yields
Theorem 1 says that a good bank's pro®ts are more sensitive to changes in costs. The implication of this result is that, even when regulators can ensure that their actions affect all banks identically in terms of costs, the higher-quality banks will suffer a greater absolute loss in pro®ts. 9 This highlights the distortionary effects of regulation: Asymmetric information regarding bank type makes ®ne-tuning regulation imperfect, and this particularly hurts higher-quality banks.
Nonregulated competition
We now explore the effects of regulation-induced cost changes in the face of different competitive environments. The idea we wish to capture is that (intrusive) direct and indirect regulation causes greater distortions in a highly competitive environment than when banks operate in a more protected environment. To facilitate this comparison, we take one representative bank from the regulated banking market. We examine the impact of regulatory cost changes when the bank enjoys a monopoly position and also when it faces an identically regulated competing bank. These results then are contrasted against the impact of similar cost changes when the representative bank faces competition from a ®rm that is not subject to regulation. The latter comparison allows us to say something about the importance of a level playing ®eld.
Pro®ts in commercial banking
Assume that there exists a representative bank, denoted type R, with per-unit costs of extending loans of C R . If this bank enjoys a monopoly when facing the inverse demand function given by (3), its equilibrium production quantity and pro®ts are
If the bank competes as a Cournot duopolist with another (identical) bank facing identical costs and regulations, then we have the following equilibrium quantity and pro®t outcomes:
Suppose now that we introduce a different type of competitor, a specialist ®nancial (SF) services ®rm that does not fall under the umbrella of regulation. The SF ®rm also can extend loans at a per-unit expected cost of C SF . For simplicity, we assume that the SF is a weaker competitor in that the bank R enjoys a cost advantage C R 5C SF . Again, O L is assumed large enough to accommodate both players in the market; that is,
In this case, equilibrium production quantities and expected pro®ts for the representative bank R and SF competing as Cournot duopolists are given by
The question we wish to ask is, How does a regulatory-induced change in costs affect the bank? And, what impact does competition have? In particular, what is the impact of having a regulated versus an unregulated competitor? Our next theorem provides some answers.
Theorem 2. The loss in expected pro®ts for a regulated bank due to an increase in per-unit costs of extending a loan is greatest when facing a non regulated competitor, smaller when acting as a monopolist, and least when facing an identically regulated bank; that is, if
Proof. Taking the partial derivatives of (13), (14), and (17) with respect to their individual per-unit costs yields
Comparing these three equations offers the following result. Given that C RG 5C SF , as long as
Theorem 2 indicates that losses imposed on a monopoly bank exceed those imposed on a bank that faces an equally regulated competitor. But regulation is most costly in terms of lost pro®ts when regulated banks face competition from unregulated ®rms; that is, when there is no level playing ®eld, regulation is most distortionary. 10 
Implications of the model
Our model can be summarized as follows. The nature of competition in the lending market is a vitally important component of the optimal regulatory framework. Consequently, any changes in regulation that manifest themselves in the costs of extending loans may hurt high-quality banks more than low-quality banks (see Theorem 1). Moreover, similar cost changes due to regulation have a bigger impact on bank pro®t when a level playing ®eld cannot be maintained (see Theorem 2).
11
These results further illustrate the competitive distortions of intrusive direct and indirect forms of regulation. The main issue is that ®ne-tuned capital requirements that seek to control the behavior of ®nancial institutions will appear in their``®rst-order conditions.'' Regulation then needs to be set at precisely the right levels to induce the right decisions. As shown in Theorem 1, with asymmetric information this might be elusive. Moreover, even if regulation is optimally ®ne-tuned, all institutions need to be subjected to it in an equal manner. A level playing ®eld is crucial. If not, distortions along the lines of Theorem 2 will appear. 12 
Conclusion
The regulation of the ®nancial services industry is a primary public policy issue. In this paper, we focus on the competitive distortions of regulation. In particular, problems of ®ne-tuning regulation and maintaining a level playing ®eld are of primary concern. The increasingly competitive nature of the ®nancial services industry elevates the importance of these distortions and forces regulators to take them into account.
A general comment that could be made is that, ultimately, the public policy makers are interested in the social welfare implications of regulatory design. Our focus on a level playing ®eld and ®ne-tuning regulations de®nitely will be relevant for social welfare, but a broader analysis is needed. In fact, the industrial organization model that we have employed could be expanded to formally address the issue of optimal regulatory design. Ideally, we would like``to solve'' for the optimal regulatory design endogenously. Social welfare issues will be of great importance to this analysis. In future work, we seek to address this question of regulatory design.
12. Giammarino, Lewis, and Sappington (1993) examine the optimal design of a risk-adjusted deposit insurance scheme when the regulator has less information than the bank about the inherent risk of the bank's assets and is unable to monitor the extent to which bank resources are being directed toward activities of lower asset quality. They ®nd that, relative to the ®rst-best situation, a socially optimal deposit insurance scheme is able to discriminate among banks on the basis of risk but, at the same time, encourages a reduction in the quality of the bank's assets.
